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We augment standard log earnings equations for workers in US
manufacturing with variables reﬂecting measured and unmeasured
attributes of their employer. Using panel employee-establishment
data, we ﬁnd that establishment-level employment, education of coworkers, capital equipment per worker, and ﬁrm-level R&D intensity affects earnings substantially. Unobserved characteristics of employers captured by employer ﬁxed effects also contribute to the
variance of log earnings, although less than unobserved characteristics of individuals captured by individual ﬁxed effects. The observed
and unobserved measures of employers mediate the effects of individual characteristics on earnings and increase earnings inequality
through sorting of workers among establishments.
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I. Introduction
Standard earnings equations relate log earnings of individuals to their
measured human capital or demographic attributes.1 These equations account for a sizable proportion of the variation in individual earnings but still
leave a sufﬁciently large residual among workers with the same measured
characteristics to challenge “the law of one price” in the US labor market.
Exemplifying the dispersion of earnings for workers with similar skills,
Devroye and Freeman (2001) found that variance of log earnings among
US workers within narrow bands of adult literacy test scores exceeded
the variance of earnings among all workers in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Much of the increased earnings inequality in the
United States from the 1970s to the 2000s, moreover, has taken the form
of increased inequality among workers with the same measured human capital or demographic attributes.
What underlies the level and change in the residual variance from log
earnings equations? One identiﬁable factor is the ﬁrm or establishment that
employs the worker. The simplest market-clearing models postulate either a
single wage or a narrow band of wages associated with costs of information
and mobility among jobs for workers with comparable skills, but the evidence often shows that employers pay sizable differences for workers with
the same measured attributes.2 Commensurately, the same worker often
earns substantially more or less working for different employers in closely
aligned periods of time.
II. ANOVA of Establishment Earnings
To see the extent to which earnings of individuals depend on where they
work in the United States in recent years, we analyzed the log earnings of
individual workers in the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics
(LEHD) Employment History Files for the nine states with LEHD data
from 1992 through 2007.3 We decomposed the total variance of log earnings
into a part attributable to differences in earnings among establishments and
a part due to differences in earnings of workers within establishments. To
keep as many observations as possible on each individual for panel data anal-

tial information is disclosed. Contact the corresponding author, Richard B. Freeman, at freeman@nber.org. Information concerning access to the data used in this
paper is available as supplementary material online.
1
We use “attributes” and “characteristics” interchangeably in this paper.
2
Earlier studies include Davis and Haltiwanger (1991), Groshen (1991), Abowd,
Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), Lane, Salmon, and Spletzer (2007), Gruetter and
LaLive (2009), Nordström Skans, Edin, and Holmlund (2009), Card, Devicienti,
and Maida (2014), Barth et al. (2016), and Song et al. (2015) as well as the contributions in Lazear and Shaw (2009).
3
See Sec. III.A below for details.
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Table 1
Variance Decomposition of Log Earnings, All Sectors, 1992 and 2007
Variance
Log
Earnings

Share of Variance
between Establishments, 2007

Change in
Variance,
1992–2007

.601

.48

.091

.66

.434 .457
.612 .713
.502 .634

.40
.56
.40

.022
.101
.132

.39
.86
.53

.508

.551

.48

.044

.80

.531 .660
.427 .482

.39
.49

.129
.054

.65
.90

.495 .508
.398 .490

.27
.45

.013
.092

2.15
.57

1992 2007
All
Mining, utilities,
and transport
Business services
Communication
Retail, wholesale,
and restaurants
Finance, insurance,
and real estate
Private services
Health, education,
and social services
Manufacturing

.510

Share of Growth
between Establishments, 1992–2007

NOTE.—Numbers are calculated from yearly regressions of log annualized sum of quarterly earnings for
all jobs in the second quarter of the year on establishment dummies. Data are from the Longitudinal
Employer-Household Dynamics. Establishment is the SEINUNIT.

ysis, we included all jobs observed in the second quarter of each year in the
LEHD. We estimated establishment effects by regressing the log earnings of
individuals on establishment dummies separately for each year and then used
the variance of the estimated coefﬁcients on establishment dummies to measure the variance of log earnings due to the between-establishment effect. The
remaining variance reﬂects earnings differences within establishments and
interactions between individuals and establishments. Since the ANOVA
does not adjust earnings for the measured attributes of individuals within
establishments or for establishment differences in average worker attributes
or observable establishment attributes, the calculations are a descriptive representation of the raw earnings data.
Table 1 displays the results of the ANOVA for 1992–2007 for the whole
US economy and for eight large one-digit sectors. The columns give the total variance of individual earnings in 1992 and 2007, the share of the variance
attributable to variance among establishments, the change in variance over
time, and the share of the change attributable to increased variance of earnings among establishments. The ﬁrst line shows that in the economy as a
whole 48% of the variance of log earnings among workers comes from variation among establishments and that 66% of the 0.091 increased variance of
earnings is due to the increase in variance among establishments.4
4
These estimates are nearly identical to those in Barth et al. (2016) based on analysis of full-year main jobs, which found that 49% of variance of log earnings was
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The remaining lines of table 1 show differences in the level and change in
the variance of log earnings among sectors. Variance is highest in business
services and in ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate and is lowest in manufacturing; in mining, utilities, and transportation; and in private services. The
share of the total variance associated with establishments is largest in business services and private services and is lowest in health, education, and
social services. Manufacturing, on which this paper focuses, has lower variance of earnings than the economy as a whole, is close to the economy-wide
share of variance associated with earnings differences among establishments, and has a lower establishment share of the 1992–2007 increase in variance.
What employer attributes determine whether an employer pays aboveor below-average market wages? How much do the individual attributes
in standard log earnings equations and unobserved individual attributes associated with earnings affect the contribution of the employer effects on the
variances shown in table 1? What economic forces compress earnings across
employers? What forces increase divergence? Do earnings differentials associated with worker characteristics differ by employer enough to contribute to the overall dispersion of earnings?
We examine these questions for manufacturing. We focus on manufacturing because of the quality of data on that sector: the Annual Survey of
Manufacturers (ASM) provides information on manufacturing establishments annually that is unavailable for other sectors and detailed evidence
on investment in capital and other inputs that are likely to affect labor productivity across establishments, potentially leading to heterogeneity of pay
through some kind of rent-sharing mechanism.5 For our analysis, we combined individual earnings from the LEHD with data on worker attributes
from the decennial census and the Current Population Survey (CPS), data
on establishment attributes from the Census of Manufacturing, and data
on ﬁrm attributes from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and
the Survey of Industrial Research and Development (SIRD).6

associated with variance of earnings in 2007 and that 67% of the increase in labor
earnings inequality from 1992 to 2007 was due to the increased variance of earnings
among establishments.
5
The literature on rent sharing relates individual earnings to establishment/ﬁrm
productivity or proﬁtability; see, e.g., Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999),
Margolis and Salvanes (2001), Dunne et al. (2004), Faggio, Salvanes, and van Reenen
(2010), Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2010), Mortensen, Christensen, and Bagger (2010),
and Card, Heining, and Kline (2013).
6
These data measure ﬁrm employment, establishment employment, capital per
worker, percentage of output exported overseas, and R&D per employee. We
use data on the individuals in each establishment to estimate the average characteristics of the establishment workforce: years of schooling, age, gender, and race.
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III. Methodology
The traditional human capital earnings equation (Mincer 1974) relates
earnings wit of individual i in period t to observable measures/indicators
of personal skill and other individual characteristics that ideally reﬂect productivity but that may also reﬂect employer attitudes or perceptions resulting from prejudicial or statistical discrimination:
log wit 5 b0 1 gt 1 xit b 1 uit ,

(1)

where gt is a period effect and xit is a vector that includes years of schooling
and individual attributes such as age, gender, and race. The equation does
not include attributes of the establishment or ﬁrm, although they can be
added to the equation to reﬂect compensating differential or other factors
related to the full compensation of workers that are not captured by the
earnings measure.
Our augmented earnings equation adds the measured and unmeasured
characteristics of an individual’s establishment/ﬁrm to equation (1):
ln wijt 5 b0 1 gt 1 xit b 1 zjðitÞt d 1 wijðitÞ 1 eijt ,

(2)

where j(it) is an index of the workplace that employs individual i at time t
and wij(it) is a unique job ﬁxed effect for every individual and workplace pair.
For clarity of exposition, we omit the (it) index and write only the index j to
indicate the workplace that employs individual i at time t in the following.
The t subscript on zjt allows observed employer characteristics to vary over
time at a workplace, which could potentially affect the earnings of workers.
Our analysis assumes that an employer characteristic affects the earnings of
all workers similarly. With a panel of workers and employers, the d coefﬁcients for the establishment characteristics are estimable using within-job
variation in employer characteristics—for example, if z relates to employment (“larger establishments pay more”), the effect of employment on earnings can be estimated for workers in the same job when the establishment
changes employment.
Having multiple observations on a person along with employer identiﬁers in longitudinal data allows us to decompose the job effect into an individual ﬁxed effect via a dummy variable for each worker, an establishment
ﬁxed effect via a dummy variable for each employer, and a match component orthogonal to the individual and establishment ﬁxed effects per the
Abowd-Kramarz-Margolis (AKM) decomposition (Abowd et al. 1999):
wij 5 ai 1 fj 1 yij . Deﬁning ai 5 Xi B 1 ai and fj 5 Zj D 1 Jj , where X
and Z are covariates for each individual and establishment, we identify
the B and D parameter vectors by assuming that the residual of the individual ﬁxed effect is orthogonal to individual ﬁxed characteristics and that the
residual of the establishment ﬁxed effect is orthogonal to establishment
ﬁxed characteristics. However, the components of both ﬁxed effects can
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correlate with time-varying characteristics and each other. Our ﬁnal augmented equation is
ln wijt 5 b0 1 gt 1 xit b 1 Xi B 1 ai 1 zjt d 1 Zj D 1 Jj 1 yij 1 eijt
5 b0 1 gt 1 qit 1 Qjt 1 yij 1 eijt ,

(3)

where qit is the individual component of the earning and Qjt is the establishment component, both of which contain observable and unobservable
parts.
Comparing equations (1) and (3), if personal skills and attributes are the
sole factors included in the estimation, the coefﬁcients of equation (1) estimate the gross return to those skills/attributes inclusive of possible gains
from access to different employers, whereas the coefﬁcients of equation (3)
measure the net return exclusive of the earnings characteristics of employers.
Alternatively, to the extent that the covariates in equation (1) are correlated
with the equation (2) variables, the estimated coefﬁcients of (1) can be viewed
as biased estimates of the net effects of skills/attributes in equation (2).
A. Matched LEHD, Establishment, and Firm Data
As noted, our dependent variable is the earnings of individual workers in
the LEHD Employment History Files for the nine states with LEHD data
from 1992 through 2007.7 We link the LEHD to the quinquennial Census
of Manufacturers (CoM) for the economic census years 1992, 1997, 2002,
and 2007 and to the ASM in intermediate years, using the LEHD Business
Register Bridge that links data at the ﬁrm level. LEHD establishments are
linked by ﬁrm, detailed industry, and county to CoM/ASM establishments.
For the vast majority of observations—single-unit ﬁrms and plants of a ﬁrm
located in a different county than other plants of the ﬁrm in the same industry—the mapping from LEHD to CoM/ASM establishments is unique
within detailed industry and county. But for plants of a ﬁrm in the same industry and county, the link is not one to one. For these establishments, we
aggregate plant characteristics to the ﬁrm-industry-county level and link
these measures to their workers.
The COM/ASM data provide production-related data on manufacturing
establishments, which we add to the ﬁles on employees: number of workers
7
The LEHD data provide annualized quarterly earnings from the unemployment insurance beneﬁt programs, linked to the Quarterly Census of Employment
and Wages. We only use observations that include positive earnings in the second
quarter of the year. Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002) describe the construction
of the LEHD data. The nine states are California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. They cover approximately half of US employment. Comparisons with data for states that cover different time periods show that the nine-state sample is reasonably representative (Barth
et al. 2016).
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at establishments and establishment capital equipment and building stock as
constructed by Foster, Grim, and Haltiwanger (2016) with perpetual inventory methods. We measure ﬁrm employment from the LBD and whether a
ﬁrm reports R&D expenditures and the amount from the SIRD. Table A1
gives summary statistics for our key variables.
We obtain measures of the years of schooling, occupation, age, race, and
gender of workers in the LEHD by linking workers to their characteristics
in the 1990 and 2000 decennial census long form and March CPS ﬁles for
1986–1997. The Census Center for Administrative Records staff matched
these data using the protected identiﬁcation key (PIK) identiﬁer, which is
the person identiﬁer in the Census, the CPS, and the LEHD. Beginning
with 2000, decennial ﬁles have very high PIK match rates, of 90%–93%
(Mulrow et al. 2011; Rastogi and O’Hara 2012). However, the 1990 PIK
is more limited due to the vintage of address ﬁles.8 Matching Census/CPS
data to the LEHD Employment History Files provides us with data on years
of schooling and other worker attributes for 20.5% of employees in the
LEHD data.9 In the matched sample, we require that a person is observed
at least four times.
Table A1 shows that the matching process produces a sample that is higher
in earnings and worker attributes that are positively associated with earnings,
such as age and being white, and a sample that is also higher in ﬁrm and establishment attributes that are positively associated with earnings, such as
number of employees and capital per employee.
IV. Variance Decomposition in Manufacturing
Table 2 gives a variance decomposition for the subset of manufacturing
workers for whom we match observations in the LEHD and CoM to decennial census or CPS ﬁles. This is the sample on which the rest of our analysis focuses. The increase in variance in the subsample falls short of the increase in the full LEHD—a variance of 0.272 compared with the table 1
ﬁgure of 0.398 in 1992 and a variance of 0.330 compared with 0.490 in
2007, producing a smaller increase in variance over time. A major reason
is that the matched sample loses many small establishments where earnings
are relatively low. The proportion of the variance in log earnings attributable to between-establishment differences is as a result lower as well. The
43% contribution of increased earnings between establishments in the
matched sample is smaller than the 57% in the full LEHD. The matched
8
Individual name and address ﬁles are highly sensitive and are not generally distributed in the US Census Bureau with the data ﬁles. Our versions of 1990 decennial ﬁles did not have original name and address data and had to be reconstructed
with other data sets. As a result, the PIK matches favor less mobile adult heads of
household.
9
We ﬁrst matched to the 2000 Census, then matched missing cases to the 1990
Census, and ﬁnally matched missing cases to the CPS data.
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Table 2
Variance Decomposition of Log Earnings in the Matched Longitudinal
Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Manufacturing Panel,
1992 and 2007
Variance,
1992
Log earnings
Between establishments
Between ﬁrms
Between establishments
within ﬁrm
Within establishments

.272
.125
.113
.012
.146

Variance,
2007

Share

.46
.42

.330
.150
.140

1
.45
.42

.058
.025
.027

1.00
.43
.47

.04
.54

.011
.180

.03
.55

2.001
.033

2.03
.57

Share
1

Change,
1992–2007

Share of
Change

NOTE.—Numbers are calculated from a regression of log earnings on time dummies and establishment
dummies. The matched sample includes LEHD data matched to the Census of Manufacturers with valid
observations of capital (from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers/Census of Manufacturers tfp ﬁles; see
Foster et al. 2016) and to education data from the decennial censuses and the Current Population Survey;
each individual is observed at least four times (for details, see Sec. III.A). All jobs included are observed in
the second quarter of the year. Slight differences between the “Between establishments” numbers and the
sum of “Between ﬁrms” and “Between establishments within ﬁrms” numbers are due to rounding errors.

sample understates the contribution of establishments to the variation in
earnings.
As establishments belong to ﬁrms that include other establishments, all of
which may be covered by ﬁrm-wide human resource and compensation
policies, we decomposed the between-establishment contribution to the
variance of earnings into an effect associated with ﬁrms and an effect associated with establishments within ﬁrms. We did this in two stages: ﬁrst by
regressing log of earnings on dummy variables for establishments and then
by regressing estimated establishment ﬁxed effects on dummy variables for
ﬁrms. The proportion of the variance attributed to ﬁrms reﬂects the overall
pay practices of ﬁrms, while the remaining proportion reﬂects pay differences among establishments in the same ﬁrm.
The table 2 calculations show that consistent with the emphasis of Song
et al. (2015) on the importance of the ﬁrm in accounting for the increased
dispersion in worker earnings over time, the ﬁrm component dominates the
variation in log earnings among establishments. In our manufacturing data,
90.4% (50.113/0.125) of the variance in earnings between establishments in
1992 is assigned to ﬁrm ﬁxed effects and 93.3% (50.140/0.150) of the establishment variance in 2007 is similarly assigned to ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. Over time,
moreover, the variance in establishment earnings for establishments within
ﬁrms fell, so that 110% (50.47/0.43) of the increased earnings dispersion associated with establishment was due to increased earnings variance among
ﬁrms.10
10
Because many small ﬁrms have only a single establishment, the calculation that
assigns virtually all of the variance of single-establishment ﬁrms to the ﬁrm could
overstate the dominance of ﬁrms in establishment effects. To see how much of the

Augmenting the Human Capital Earnings Equation

S79

V. Cross-Section Earnings Equations
Column 1 of table 3 records estimated coefﬁcients and standard errors for
ordinary least squares regressions of the benchmark cross-section log earnings equation with years of schooling, age, gender, and some interactions to
allow for differences in effects among those attributes. In addition, the regression includes 171 geographic area dummies and 16 year dummies so
that the coefﬁcients are estimated within year and area. The estimated coefﬁcients are similar to those typically found in the human capital earnings literature: an estimated average return to years of schooling of about 9.4% per
year and a concave age proﬁle captured by the negative squared term and
gender and race earnings gaps at 30% and 17%, respectively. The R2 of
the equation of 0.45 is larger than the R2 in earnings functions ﬁt on CPS
data,11 presumably because variation in earnings in the entire economy exceeds that in manufacturing and/or because the administrative LEHD earnings has less measurement error than self-reported earnings in the CPS.
Column 2 adds a set of workplace variables to reﬂect place of employment: four-digit NAICS industry dummies, the log number of employees
of the ﬁrm, the log number of employees in the establishment, and establishment age and its square.12 The estimates show signiﬁcant ﬁrm and establishment effects and a concave earning-establishment age proﬁle. Adding
the ﬁrm and establishment characteristics raises the R2 to 0.505 and thus explains 10% of the residual variance of earnings for demographically similar
persons. The ﬁrm and establishment variables shrink the positive coefﬁcients on years of schooling and age and the negative coefﬁcients on gender
and being nonwhite, indicating that some of the impact of those factors
comes through sorting of workers among establishments and industries
within manufacturing.
Column 3 adds variables relating to the attributes of the establishment’s
workforce: mean years of schooling, mean age, share female, and share nonwhite; capital structures per worker and capital equipment per worker; the
export share of establishment revenues; and the R&D investment of the
ﬁrm to which the establishment belongs. The most striking result is the high
estimated coefﬁcient on the years of schooling of all workers. The estimated
0.069 coefﬁcient on the mean years of schooling in the workers’ establishment compared with the 0.074 coefﬁcient on the workers’ own education
table 2 result is due to single-unit ﬁrms, we eliminated them from the data set and
decomposed the variances of earnings among multiunit establishments. Table A2
shows that among multiestablishment ﬁrms, 83% (50.094/0.113) of the variation
in establishment ﬁxed effects is associated with the ﬁrm ﬁxed effect, which supports
the conclusion in the text.
11
Estimating a similar regression with CPS data for the whole workforce gave an
R2 of 0.35.
12
Dickens and Katz (1987) examine industry wage differentials. Brown and Medoff
(1989) study employer size-wage effects.
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Establishment age

Log establishment employment

Establishment and ﬁrm
characteristics:
Log ﬁrm employment

Female  Nonwhite

Female  Age2

Female  Age

Nonwhite

Female

Age2

Age

Years of schooling

.0943***
(.0001)
.0132***
(.0000)
2.0005***
(.0000)
2.3022***
(.0006)
2.1707***
(.0005)
2.0050***
(.0000)
.0000***
(.0000)
.0309***
(.0009)

Model 1:
No Establishment
Characteristics
(1)

.0295***
(.0001)
.0266***
(.0002)
.0032***
(.0001)

.0820***
(.0001)
.0118***
(.0000)
2.0005***
(.0000)
2.2897***
(.0006)
2.1539***
(.0005)
2.0045***
(.0000)
.0000***
(.0000)
.0318***
(.0009)

Model 2:
Establishment
Characteristic I
(2)

.0173***
(.0001)
.0270***
(.0002)
.0045***
(.0001)

.0737***
(.0001)
.0116***
(.0000)
2.0005***
(.0000)
2.2691***
(.0005)
2.1405***
(.0005)
2.0045***
(.0000)
.0000***
(.0000)
.0384***
(.0008)

Model 3:
Establishment
Characteristic II
(3)

.0071***
(.0005)
.0258***
(.0003)
.0032***
(.0001)

.0739***
(.0001)
.0116***
(.0000)
2.0005***
(.0000)
2.2671***
(.0005)
2.1397***
(.0005)
2.0045***
(.0000)
.0000***
(.0000)
.0371***
(.0008)

Model 4:
Plus Firm
Fixed Effects
(4)

.0012***
(.0003)
.0232***
(.0006)

.0739***
(.0001)
.0115***
(.0000)
2.0005***
(.0000)
.2669***
(.0005)
2.1400***
(.0005)
2.0044***
(.0000)
.0000***
(.0000)
.0373***
(.0000)

Model 5:
Plus Establishment
Fixed Effects
(5)

Table 3
Estimated Regression Coefﬁcients and Standard Errors for Augmented Earnings Equations, Including Firm and Establishment
Characteristics for Manufacturing, 1992–2007
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*** p < .001.

Industry effects
Firm effects
Establishment effects
Region (171) effects
Year (16) effects
r 2 adjusted
N

Firm R&D/employee

Log capital equipment/employee

Log capital structures/employee

Export share

Share nonwhite

Share female

Mean age

Mean years of schooling

Establishment age2

Table 3 (Continued)

Y
Y
.452
5.13E106

Model 1:
No Establishment
Characteristics
(1)

Y
Y
.505
5.13E106

Y
Y
.526
5.13E106

2.0001***
(.0000)
.0690***
(.0003)
.0027***
(.0001)
2.3176***
(.0016)
2.0185***
(.0017)
.0115***
(.0004)
.0074***
(.0002)
.0462***
(.0003)
.7260***
(.0104)
Y

2.0001***
(.0000)

Y

Model 3:
Establishment
Characteristic II
(3)

Model 2:
Establishment
Characteristic I
(2)

Y
.566
5.13E106

2.0001***
(.0000)
.0483***
(.0004)
.0017***
(.0001)
2.2548***
(.0029)
.0029
(.0028)
.0062***
(.0005)
.0033***
(.0003)
.0211***
(.0004)
.1228***
(.0131)
Y
Y

Model 4:
Plus Firm
Fixed Effects
(4)

Y
.577
5.13E106

Y

2.0000***
(.0000)
.0249***
(.0007)
2.0034***
(.0001)
2.1084***
(.0056)
.0256***
(.0046)
.0068***
(.0006)
.0018***
(.0004)
.0075***
(.0005)
.1627***
(.0129)

Model 5:
Plus Establishment
Fixed Effects
(5)
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suggests that it is almost as good to work in an establishment with more educated workers as it is to have more education. The estimates also show that
workers earn more in establishments with older workers and less in establishments with a larger proportion of female or nonwhite workers. More
capital equipment per worker raises earnings more than more capital structures per worker (a coefﬁcient difference of 0.046 vs. 0.007), and earnings
are higher in establishments with a high export share. Finally, earnings rise
with R&D intensity of a ﬁrm: workers in ﬁrms with 1 standard deviation
higher R&D intensity average 2% more earnings.
Column 4 gives the regression results with dummy variables for ﬁrms
added to the equation, while column 5 gives results with dummy variables
for establishments replacing those for ﬁrms. With establishment ﬁxed effects in the model, it is no longer possible to identify separately the linear
effect of establishment age and the time dummies, so we have removed
the linear term for establishment age. Since the effect of linear age is now
absorbed by the time dummies, none of the remaining estimators are affected.
Addition of the ﬁrm ﬁxed effects substantially reduces the estimated impact
of the number of employees at the ﬁrm, indicating that short-run changes in
ﬁrm employment have little effect on earnings but only reduce the coefﬁcient
on number of employees at the establishment modestly. The column 5 estimates with dummy variables for establishment also markedly reduce the coefﬁcient for ﬁrm employment but leave a substantial effect of establishment
employment on earnings. With establishment ﬁxed effects in the equation,
the positive effect of establishment employment suggests that an establishment operates along a rising supply curve of labor for short-term increases
in employment, which suggests some monopsony power in the labor market
(Manning 2005).
Addition of the ﬁrm and establishment dummies naturally shrinks the estimated effect of ﬁrm and establishment variables on earnings. The column 4
ﬁrm ﬁxed effects regression eliminates the negative relationship between the
share of nonwhite employees. Working in an establishment with a large
nonwhite share is associated with low earnings, but short-run changes in
the nonwhite share do not affect establishment earnings much. The column 4
ﬁxed effects regression also greatly weakens the relationship between R&D
and earnings, reducing the estimated coefﬁcient by more than 80%. While
R&D ﬁrms pay more than ﬁrms that do less R&D, changes in R&D activity
within a ﬁrm have little effect on earnings.
The column 5 regression, which includes establishment ﬁxed effects, further shrinks the coefﬁcients of most of the establishment workforce characteristics compared with those in column 3. The estimated 0.0690 effect of
the mean years of schooling on earnings in column 3 drops to 0.0249 in column 5, while the estimated 20.3176 for being female in column 3 drops to
20.1084 in column 5. While measurement error usually accounts for some
of the lower coefﬁcient on variables in longitudinal analysis compared with
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cross-section analysis (Freeman 1984), the pooling of observations to create
average characteristics is likely to diminish measurement error so that huge
drops in the effects of these characteristics are likely to at least in part reﬂect
economic behavior as ﬁrms adjust earnings to changing characteristics gradually over time.
VI. Panel Earnings Equations
The longitudinal structure of the LEHD allows us to estimate the effects
of employer characteristics on earnings for the same individual in two ways:
(1) by comparing workers who remain in the same job while management
changes characteristics of the establishment or does nothing to offset changes
due to factors outside management control, such as workers retiring or quitting for another job without replacing the leaver with someone similar, and
(2) by comparing workers who quit an employer with one set of characteristics to join an employer with other characteristics. Outside of recession years,
the bulk of the labor mobility comes from worker decisions to move to a new
employer willing to hire them. In recessions, mobility depends more on the
layoff decisions of ﬁrms, with the number of layoffs increasing to approach
or exceed the number of quits.13 While our data lack information on whether
a worker left a job by quitting or by layoff, recession years are less frequent
than nonrecession years in our data, which suggests that the bulk of the
worker changes reﬂect quits rather than layoffs.14
Table 4 presents estimates of the effect of employer attributes on the earnings of the same worker when those attributes change. Column 1 shows the
results of adding individual ﬁxed effects to the basic log earnings regression
from column 3 in table 3 for all workers in the matched sample. The coefﬁcients on some employer variables decline with the addition of the worker
ﬁxed effects: the estimated coefﬁcient for average years of schooling of
workers in an establishment falls by 59% (from 0.0737 to 0.0299), suggesting
that much of the large coworker schooling effect is due to positive sorting of
workers by unmeasured individual characteristics into establishments with
more educated workers. The coefﬁcient on the equipment stock of capital
per employee drops more massively by 70% (from 0.0462 to 0.0140), suggesting positive sorting of unmeasured individual characteristics into establishments with more equipment capital. And the coefﬁcient on R&D drops
by 83% (from 0.762 to 0.1290), suggesting that most of the cross-section
13
For nonrecession years, the number of quits divided by the number of layoffs
exceeds 1.0 by 30%–50%. In recession years, the number of layoffs exceeds quits.
See chart 7 in BLS (2015).
14
We did not probe possible differences between job changes from establishments having large drops in employment, where layoffs are potentially important,
and job changes from establishments with stable or growing employment, where
the locus would likely be voluntary shifts to better outside opportunities.
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Table 4
Estimated Regression Coefﬁcients and Standard Errors for Firm and
Establishment Characteristics: Individual Fixed Effects and Job
Fixed Effects Models

Log ﬁrm employment
Log establishment employment
Establishment age
Establishment age square
Mean years of schooling
Mean age
Share female
Share nonwhite
Export share
Log capital structures/employee
Log capital equipment/employee
Firm R&D expenses/employee
r 2 adjusted
N

Model 1:
Individual Fixed
Effects,
All Workers
(1)

Model 2:
Individual-Job
Fixed Effects,
Stayers
(2)

Model 3:
Individual
Fixed Effects,
Movers
(3)

.0161***
(.0001)
.0305***
(.0002)
.0037***
(.0001)
2.0001***
(.0000)
.0299***
(.0003)
.0023***
(.0002)
2.1573***
(.0020)
.0250***
(.0019)
.0000
(.0003)
.0059***
(.0002)
.0140***
(.0002)
.1290***
(.0060)
.873
5.13E106

.0056***
(.0002)
.0214***
(.0003)

.0162***
2.0003
.0180***
2.0005
2.0008***
(.0002)
.0000
(.0000)
.0322***
2.0008
.0023***
2.0002
2.1765***
2.0044
.0230***
2.0042
.0020*
2.0009
.0031***
2.0004
.0189***
2.0006
.2075***
2.0188
.827
7.31E105

2.0000***
(.0000)
.0048***
(.0004)
2.0129***
(.0001)
2.0036
(.0033)
.1025***
(.0029)
2.0021***
(.0003)
.0002
(.0003)
.0027***
(.0003)
.0860***
(.0057)
.913
5.13E106

NOTE.—All models include year dummies, age2, the interaction between gender and age, and the interaction between gender and age2. The ﬁrst and third models include individual ﬁxed effects, and the second
model includes job (i.e., match: the unique combination of individual and establishment) ﬁxed effects.
Individual-speciﬁc variables that do not vary over time, such as years of education, are absorbed by the individual ﬁxed effects.
* p < .05.
*** p < .001.

R&D effect is due to a positive matching between R&D ﬁrms and unmeasured individual characteristics.
The next two columns unpack the ﬁxed effects model into its two parts.
Column 2 estimates the effect of employer characteristics on the earnings of
workers who stay in the same establishment. This speciﬁcation controls for
what we call “job-individual ﬁxed effects”—the unique combination of an
individual and the establishment, which encompasses both the establishment ﬁxed effects and the individual ﬁxed effect from the AKM decompo-
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sition, in addition to a potential match-speciﬁc ﬁxed effect. As in table 3, the
linear effect of establishment age is no longer separately identiﬁed from the
time effects and is thus omitted from the model. Column 3 estimates the impact of employer factors on the earnings of workers who changed employers, which identiﬁes the effects of establishment characteristics through
changes in the employer and thus does not control for establishment ﬁxed
effects or match-speciﬁc effects.15
For most establishment characteristics, the column 3 estimated effects of
worker-initiated changes have a much greater impact on earnings than do
the column 2 estimated effects of employer-initiated changes. Moving to
a ﬁrm that has greater employment gives an earnings increase of 0.0162,
while working in a ﬁrm that increases employment changes gives a 0.0056
boost to earnings—about one-third as large. Moving from an establishment
with more years of schooling increases earnings by 0.0322, compared with
an increase in earnings of 0.0048 when a worker’s current establishment increases its years of schooling. Moving to an establishment with older workers raises the earnings of the mover, while staying in an establishment with a
rising age of the workforce reduces the worker’s earnings. The effect of
R&D on earnings is more than twice as large for movers than for stayers
(0.2075 vs. 0.0860). But not all characteristics have a larger effect for movers
than for stayers. An increase in establishment employment has a modestly
larger effect for persons who stay with an establishment than for those who
move, and similarly for the share of nonwhites.
Mechanically, the differences between the column 2 stayers-based estimates and the column 3 movers-based estimates reﬂect the fact that the
stayers analysis controls for unobserved establishment ﬁxed effects and
thus removes correlations between those effects and the earnings, while
the movers model does not do this. But the differences also reﬂect economic
behavior. A worker who chooses to change employers will likely require a
larger increase in pay to cover the costs of mobility than one who stays at a
job. An establishment that changes characteristics will likely adjust operations slowly and alter pay less in the short run compared with employers
whose characteristics differ over longer periods and whose pay structures
reﬂect long-term differences in the mode of operating.16
Earnings equations with individual ﬁxed effects cannot identify the relation between stable individual characteristics and earnings: those effects are
15
For this analysis we examine every job-to-job move in the data, retaining only
the observations before and after the move, and include individual ﬁxed effects in
the regression.
16
Measurement error will also bias downward the estimates based on changes,
for the basic reason that a given error will have a proportionately larger impact
on the small variation in year-to-year changes at the same workplace than on the
larger differences between the employer the worker joins and the employer the
worker leaves.
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Table 5
Regression of Estimated Individual Fixed Effects on Years of Schooling and
Demographic Individual Characteristics from Three Models of Log Earnings
Model 1: Fixed
Effects from
Model with Individual Characteristics
Only
(1)
Years of schooling
Dummy variable for female
Dummy variable for nonwhite
Age
Gender  Nonwhite interaction
r 2 adjusted
Variance of the estimated unobserved
individual effects

.1076***
(.0001)
2.3553***
(.0004)
2.1001***
(.0005)
.0136***
(.0000)
.0504***
(.0009)
.441
.149

Model 3: Fixed EfModel 2: Fixed fects from Model
Effects from with Individual and
Model with InEstablishment
dividual and
Characteristics and
Establishment Establishment Fixed
Effects
Characteristics
(3)
(2)
.0917***
(.0001)
2.3326***
(.0004)
2.0882***
(.0005)
.0128***
(.0000)
.0500***
(.0008)
.422
.127

.0841***
(.0001)
2.3129***
(.0004)
2.1119***
(.0004)
.0112***
(.0000)
.0429***
(.0007)
.416
.112

NOTE.—The dependent variable is the individual ﬁxed effects from models including time-varying covariates. Number of observations is 5.13E106 for all columns.
*** p < .001.

absorbed in the individual dummy variables. But it is possible to learn
something about how years of schooling and demographic factors such as
gender, race, or age affect the individual ﬁxed effects by regressing the estimated ﬁxed effect for individuals on those characteristics. Say we have
10 workers with two deﬁning characteristics, years of schooling and gender.
The ﬁxed effects earnings equation would produce estimated coefﬁcients
for each of the 10 workers that could be regressed on the workers’ schooling
and gender to capture their relation to the ﬁxed effects. Columns 1–3 of table 5 give the results of such an analysis in three regression models. Model 1
uses estimated individual ﬁxed effects from a regression without employer
characteristics.17 Model 2 uses estimated individual ﬁxed effects from a regression with observable employer characteristics. Model 3 uses estimated
individual ﬁxed effects from a stayers’ regression that includes establishment and match-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects (eq. [3]). The estimated relations between the individual effects that are positively related to the characteristics
of employers decline across the columns as we add increasing information
17
The difference is that in the ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation, the unobserved individual ﬁxed effects are allowed to be correlated with all of the included time-varying
covariates.
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Table 6
Variance Decomposition of the Full Augmented Earnings Equation Model
Determinants of Earnings

Variance Decomposition

Log earnings
Individual components
Observed individual
Unobserved individual
2  Cov(observed individual, unobserved individual)
Within-match residual
Establishment components
Observed establishment
Unobserved establishment
Unobserved ﬁrm
Unobserved establishment within ﬁrm
2  Cov(observed establishment, unobserved establishment)
2  Cov(individual components, establishment components)
2  Cov(observed individual, observed establishment)
2  Cov(observed individual, unobserved establishment)
2  Cov(unobserved individual, observed establishment)
2  Cov(unobserved individual, unobserved establishment)
Match component

.299
.188
.078
.112
2.002
.020
.043
.024
.020
.016
.005
2.001
.038
.022
.012
.008
2.006
.010

NOTE.—Calculations used eq. (3) to structure decomposition. Number of observations is 5.13E106.
Data are for the manufacturing matched sample, as described in the text. Year dummies are not included
in the calculations. Some numbers do not add up due to rounding errors.

on where the employee works. The returns to years of schooling drops
from 0.1076 for the model 1 speciﬁcation that has no controls for employee
characteristics to 0.0841 for the model 3 speciﬁcation that controls for observed and unobserved establishment effects. The coefﬁcient on female falls
by 12%, and the coefﬁcient on age falls by 18%.
The bottom line in table 5 (“Variance of the estimated unobserved individual effects”) shows how the addition of establishment characteristics reduces the contribution of the ﬁxed effects for individuals to the variation of
earnings among workers. In model 1, the individual ﬁxed effect variance is
0.149, or 51% of the total variance. In model 2, which includes measured
establishment characteristics, the individual ﬁxed effect variance falls to
0.127, or 43% of the total variance. In model 3 with observed and unobserved establishment characteristics, the variance of the individual effect is
0.112, or about 38% of the total variance in earnings. Put differently, establishment factors account for 25% (ð0:149 2 0:112Þ=0:149) of the variance of
estimated individual effects.
VII. A Full Decomposition
Table 6 summarizes our ﬁndings with a full decomposition of log earnings in the augmented earnings equation. The standard individual characteristics of years of schooling, age, gender, and race account for 26% of the total variation in earnings; unobserved individual effects account for 37% of
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the variation; observed establishment characteristics account for 8% of the
variance; unobserved establishment effects account for 7% of the variance;
and the match component accounts for 3% of the variance. The covariance
between the individual and establishment components of the earnings equation adds 13% of the variance. The remaining variation arises from the transitory within-match residual comprising 7% of the total variation and to
small negative covariance terms between the observed and unobserved parts
of the individual and establishment components, respectively.18 The most
important factors relate to individuals, but employer factors and their relation to individual factors are signiﬁcant and substantive.
VIII. The Sorting of Workers between Establishments
The interaction between individual characteristics and establishment
characteristics suggests that sorting of workers with given characteristics
among workplaces with different characteristics affects inequality at large.
Positive assortative matching of workers high in measured or unmeasured
skills/wages to high-wage establishments raises the inequality of earnings.
By contrast, assortative matching of workers with workers of similar measured skill does not create “extra inequality” but points to the complementarity of skills of similar workers in the production process and allocation of
labor.
Assortative matching also affects the interpretation of estimated coefﬁcients on particular variables. When workers positively sort by education
into higher-paying establishments, the traditional log earnings equation
that excludes establishment factors captures two effects in its estimated coefﬁcient on years of schooling: the return of higher skills to earnings within
an establishment and the differential access that schooling gives workers to
obtaining jobs in higher-paying establishments. Addition of dummy variables for establishments limits the effect of years of schooling to its effect
within an establishment. Given that sorting of workers between establishments affects the dispersion of pay and the returns to individual characteristics, we analyze next the ways in which workers and ﬁrms match up.
Table 7 gives the correlation coefﬁcients for sorting by key earnings determinants. The largest correlations show considerable sorting of workers
with workers like themselves: correlations of educated workers with educated workers (0.477), of older workers with older workers (0.333), of females with females (0.349), and of nonwhites with nonwhites (0.471). But
18
Our model assumes that the ﬁxed individual and establishment/ﬁrm effects remain constant throughout the sample period. Experiments with estimation on
subperiods show that in fact the variance of both the individual ﬁxed effects and
the establishment ﬁxed effects appear to rise during the sample period. The period
over which to treat individual and establishment/ﬁrm ﬁxed effects as ﬁxed raises
statistical and modeling issues and merits further analysis.
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Table 7
Correlation Coefﬁcients between Individual and Establishment/Firm
Characteristics
Log ﬁrm employment
Log establishment employment
Establishment age
Export share
Log structures capital/employee
Log equipment capital/employee
Firm R&D/employee
Mean years of schooling
Mean age
Share female
Share nonwhite
Establishment observables as a group,
weighted by effect on earnings
Establishment ﬁxed effect

Years of Schooling

Age

Female

Nonwhite

.200
2.028
.214
.103
.185
.117
.216
.477
.110
2.033
2.146

.060
.149
.034
.044
.069
.071
.015
.031
.333
2.041
.005

2.002
2.014
.015
.005
2.059
2.100
.000
2.030
2.060
.349
.080

2.059
2.028
2.042
2.054
2.087
2.075
.000
2.128
2.036
.105
.471

.258
.112

2.022
.069

2.084
2.061

.030
2.066

NOTE.—Coefﬁcients are tabulated from the matched data ﬁle for manufacturing workers, as described in
the text.

other characteristics of employers are sufﬁciently correlated with worker
characteristics to suggest sorting of workers among establishments beyond
homophily. Educated workers work in large ﬁrms and in R&D-intensive
ﬁrms, in establishments with high capital per worker and high export shares.
These patterns make it likely that some of the education earnings premium
comes through the greater likelihood that educated workers ﬁnd jobs in employers with other earning-enhancing characteristics. Older workers are also
associated with establishments with high-earning characteristics, although the
correlations are much smaller. By contrast, women work in establishments
with lower capital intensity, and nonwhite workers are largely employed in
establishments with low-earning characteristics.
The bottom two lines of the table shows the correlation between a composite measure of the establishment contribution to earnings through observed variables plus industry and region, weighted by their estimated effect
on earnings, and through establishment ﬁxed effects. Both the establishment observables and the ﬁxed effects are highly correlated with years of
schooling, making schooling potentially the most important dimension of
worker sorting among establishments.
Figure 1 summarizes the relations between the characteristics of workers
and those of the establishments where they work via the correlations between indices of the observed characteristics as a group, weighted by their
respective coefﬁcients in the earnings equation, and the ﬁxed effects associated for workers as well as for establishments. The largest correlation is between the individual observables weighted by their contribution to earnings
and establishment observables weighted by their contribution to earnings
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FIG. 1.—Correlation coefﬁcients between individual observables and unobservables with establishment observables and unobservables. Coefﬁcients are calculated
from the matched data ﬁle for manufacturing workers, as described in the text.
FE 5 ﬁxed effect. A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.

(0.253), followed by the correlation between the individual observables and
the establishment unobserved ﬁxed effect. By contrast, the ﬁxed effect of individuals is weakly positively correlated with the establishment observables,
while the individual unobservables and unobserved establishment ﬁxed effects are negatively correlated—a result consistent with Abowd et al. (2014).
As Andrews et al. (2008) notes, a negative correlation between two unobserved components of earnings could result from sampling and measurement errors,19 so the safest conclusion from these correlations is that sorting
of workers occurs largely on observable characteristics.
IX. Mobility across Employers
The impact of employer characteristics on the earnings of workers with
similar measured characteristics and ﬁxed effects and the table 7 and ﬁgure 1
correlations direct attention to the potential role of worker mobility among
employers in determining pay. To what extent does mobility from job to
job raise pay? How often do workers who start their careers in establishments
with low-earning characteristics move to ﬁrms with better observable and unobservable characteristics over time? And conversely, how much downward
ﬁrm mobility is there among workers who begin their careers at ﬁrms with
high-earning characteristics?
19

Lise, Meghir, and Robin (2013) provide further discussion of these issues.
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To examine the transitions of workers among establishments with different establishment components of earnings, we formed a transition matrix
for workers in our data in both 1992 and 2007. We attached to every worker
the total establishment contribution to earnings, deﬁned as the sum of the
contribution to earnings of the time-varying establishment characteristics,
such as ﬁrm size and R&D spending; the ﬁxed observables, such as industry
and region; and the unobserved establishment effects. With an establishment contribution for each worker in 1992 and 2007, the natural measure
of each worker’s mobility is the change in the establishment component
of earnings of their employer in those years.
Table 8 summarizes the transition pattern by quintiles of the distributions, ordered from low-paying ﬁrms in quintile 1 to high-paying ﬁrms
in quintile 5. The rows in the table show the distribution of workers by
the 1992 quintile distribution of their employer into the 2007 quintile distribution of their employer. While the largest probabilities are for workers
to remain in the same quintile over time, there is evidence of upward movement among establishments. Workers in the low quintiles have larger shares
going up in the distribution than workers in the top quintiles have shares
falling in the distribution. Among workers in the third quintile, 38% move
to a higher quintile, whereas only 21% move down and 40% remain in the
same quintile. New workers come into the distribution of ﬁrms at the lower
end and change jobs over time to produce a lifetime move up the distribution. Measured by productivity of establishments rather than earnings,
Haltiwanger, Hyatt, and McEntarfer (2018, in this issue) ﬁnd a similar pattern in productivity, with younger workers in particular moving from less
productive to more productive ﬁrms over time.
Finally, we characterize the sorting of workers with workers between
establishments by Kremer and Maskin’s (1996) index of segregation, r 5
covðq qÞ=VðqÞ, where q is the average individual component of the establishment and V(q) is the variance of the individual components of the
Table 8
Transitions of Workers among Establishments Ordered by Establishment
Contribution to Earnings (Observable Characteristics Weighted by Their
Earnings Coefﬁcients Plus Fixed Effect) by Quintile of the Distribution,
1992–2007
Quintile (2007)
1992
Quintile 1
Quintile 2
Quintile 3
Quintile 4
Quintile 5

Change in Share

1

2

3

4

5

All

Up

.564
.172
.078
.042
.017

.258
.401
.136
.062
.024

.097
.287
.403
.113
.033

.056
.108
.329
.451
.136

.024
.032
.054
.331
.790

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

.436
.427
.383
.331

Down
.172
.214
.217
.210

NOTE.—Data are calculated on the balanced panel only. Quintiles of the distribution of the establishment
effect include both unobserved and observed components of the establishment contribution.
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standard earnings equation. If workers segregate completely between establishments according to their individual earnings components, r 5 1,
whereas if they randomly allocate between establishments, r 5 0. The index of segregation for observable characteristics in our data is 0.24, while
the index for unobservable characteristics is 0.17. This supports the implication of the correlations that sorting of workers according to observed individual characteristics, such as years of schooling, age, gender, and race, is
considerably stronger than segregation according to unobserved attributes.
We characterize the sorting of workers with establishments by the equivalent Kremer-Maskin (1996) index, rQ 5 covðq, QÞ=VðqÞ, where Q is the
earnings components of establishment and divide the decomposition into
its within-establishment (Vw) and between-establishment (V b) parts by
the identities
V w ðlog wÞ 5 V ðqÞð1 2 rÞ 1 V ðyÞ 1 V ðeÞ,

(4a)

V b ðlog wÞ 5 V ðqÞðr 1 2rQ Þ 1 V ðQÞ:

(4b)

In our data, r 5 0:247 and rQ 5 0:100. The within-establishment component is 59% of the variance in earnings, of which 82% arises from the observed and unobserved individual component, 6% arises from the match
component, and 12% arises from the residual. The between component contributes 41% of the variance in earnings, of which 36% is due to workerworker sorting, 30% is due to worker-establishment sorting, and 34% is due
to variance of the establishment effect. That most of the within-establishment
variation in earnings is associated with variables related to individuals and
most of the between-establishment variation in earnings is associated with
variables related to establishments and sorting of workers among establishments suggests that the simple within and between decomposition offers
powerful insight into the role of supply and demand factors in earnings determination.
X. Conclusion
Augmenting the earnings equation with measured characteristics of employers and unobserved earnings-related ﬁxed effects for establishment or
ﬁrm adds substantially to the variance in log earnings explicable by an earnings equation. The regressions identify observable employer-side factors—
capital equipment per worker, R&D investments, export performance, the
level of schooling of an establishment’s workforce, the number of employees, and, up to a point, the age of the establishment—associated with higher
worker earnings. While the sizable cross-section effects of measured employer characteristics diminish in longitudinal data with the inclusion of
ﬁrm and establishment ﬁxed effects, those ﬁxed effects are another manifestation of the importance of where a person works to what they earn.
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The evidence that addition of establishment- or ﬁrm-related variables reduces the estimated coefﬁcient on the key human capital variable, years of
schooling, by about one-ﬁfth directs attention to the role of schooling in
giving workers access to higher-paying workplaces. The near comparability
of the estimated effect of average establishment schooling and of the individual’s years of schooling (absent ﬁrm or establishment ﬁxed effects) further suggests that some of the gains from human capital investments spill
over to other workers,20 while the drop in the estimated coefﬁcient on average years of schooling with the addition of establishment ﬁxed effects reﬂects the strong positive relation between average years of schooling and establishment ﬁxed effects.
The evidence that the estimated coefﬁcients on gender, race, and age diminish when we introduce individual and establishment ﬁxed effects provides
further support for the notion that the sorting of workers among employers
is important in earnings differentials. Youth, females, and nonwhites are more
likely to be found in low-paying establishments, and the coefﬁcients for the
establishment-speciﬁc average of the demographic characteristics change
signs or turns insigniﬁcant once we control for job ﬁxed effects. While the
dynamics of worker mobility has workers moving to enterprises with higher
observable and ﬁxed effects earnings components over time, assortative
matching tends to magnify the effect on inequality beyond what would be the
direct impact of earnings differences across establishments.
Taken together, the dual ﬁndings that where a person works affects their
earnings and that sorting of workers among employers accounts for some of
the differentials in earnings associated with years of schooling and demographic characteristics raises new questions for analysis: Why does having
more educated coworkers affect individual earnings so much? To what
extent do costs of mobility account for the greater impact of employeeinstituted than employer-instituted changes in the payoff from working with
other inputs? How important are explicit human resource and compensation
policies in positioning employers in the distribution of earnings? And do
their decisions equilibrate the marginal payoffs to paying above- or belowmarket average levels of pay? Finally, given manufacturing’s modest and declining share of employment, our analysis suggests the value of estimating
augmented earnings functions in other industries to see whether the role of
employers and sorting of workers found here generalizes to the labor market
writ large.

20
The relation between the average years of schooling at an establishment and
individual pay is mindful of the observed positive relation between the average level
of education at a regional or city level and earnings, which has been interpreted in
terms of human capital externalities (see, e.g., Moretti 2004).
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Appendix
Table A1
Summary Statistics: Mean and Standard Deviation (SD) of Variables for the
Full Sample of Persons in the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics
(LEHD) Manufacturing Data Set and in the Matched Sample That Includes
Measures of Years of Schooling
Full Sample
Mean
Years of schooling
Age
Female
Nonwhite
Log ﬁrm employment
Log establishment employment
Log capital structures/employee
Log capital equipment/employee
Export share of establishment
Firm R&D/employee
Log earnings
Observations (in millions)

42.58
.300
.302
8.234
6.300
3.250
3.918
.626
.009
6.649
23.4

Matched Sample

SD

Mean

SD

10.183
.458
.459
2.403
1.572
1.333
1.049
.484
.021
.554

12.72
43.41
.294
.237
8.288
6.317
3.297
3.953
.638
.009
6.682
5.1

2.311
9.978
.456
.425
2.268
1.512
1.296
1.035
.481
.020
.543

NOTE.—The full sample is tabulated for all workers in the LEHD; the matched sample is tabulated for
workers reporting years of schooling in match with the Census or the Current Population Survey, as described in the text.

Table A2
Variance Decomposition of Earnings among Workers, in All
Firms and in Multiestablishment Firms, Matched Panel, 1992–
2007
Log earnings
Between establishments
Between ﬁrms
Between establishments
Within ﬁrm
Within establishments

All

Share

MUs

Share

.293
.119
.106

1

.279
.113
.094

1

.013
.174

.41
.36
.04
.59

.018
.166

.41
.34
.06
.59

NOTE.—Firms in the “All” establishment sample include the establishment effects for
single-unit ﬁrms, whereas the “MUs” sample includes only multiestablishment ﬁrms (deﬁned as multiunit ﬁrms within manufacturing only). Numbers are calculated from a regression of log earnings on time dummies and establishment dummies. The total variance
is calculated after subtracting variance due to the time dummies. Firm effects are estimated
from regression of establishment ﬁxed effects on ﬁrm dummies. Multiunit ﬁrms are deﬁned as multiunit ﬁrms within manufacturing only.
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